





Mineral conflict in Antarctica 
 































Since the industrial revolution at the beginning of the last century, the search for 
exploitable mineral reserves has become more and more important. This increasing 
demand has put pressure on non-renewable resources, which was first recognised in the 
1970’s and early 80’s.  
 
Increasing demand and lack of secure supply from mineral rich countries such as South 
Africa and Russia, led the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP) to agree to 
negotiate a minerals convention. This convention was merely to regulate mineral 
resources and hence prevent Antarctica from being exploited by an unregulated 
scramble. The negotiations for such a mineral convention, known as the Convention on 
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA), took six years as it 
was difficult to find a common nominator. The final document was open for signature in 
1988, however soon after, Australia and France refused to sign the convention they 
helped to negotiate. Instead they proposed that the ATCP should agree on 
environmental standards and regulations, which would prohibit mining. After a further 
three years, the Madrid Protocol was adopted, which banned mineral activities in 
Antarctica for 50 years.  
 
This review will investigate what the controversies between the different parties were 
during the six years of discussion and investigate what were the underlying motives for 
France and Australia rejection of CRAMRA. It further comments on the fact, if 
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The establishment of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities (CRAMRA) was a result of an increasing awareness of finite mineral resources 
in the 1970’s, triggered mainly by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC)1 (Elliot, 1994). In addition, the still prominent cold war tension, which risked 
the supply of minerals from the Soviet Union and the apartheid problem in the mineral 
rich country South Africa increased this awareness (Beeby, 1984, Greenpeace, 1985; 
Hemmings, 2003; Wallace, 1988). Hence, informal discussions around potential mineral 
exploration and exploitation in Antarctica increased, based on the fact that Antarctica 
was once part of the ancient Gondwanaland and hence was connected to resource rich 
continents such as Australia (Wallace, 1988).  
 
The Antarctica Treaty, signed in 1959 did not however, include strategies of how to deal 
with exploration or exploitation of potential Antarctic resources. Thus, with increasing 
pressure and resource demand, this “gap” in the treaty, had to be filled (Wallace, 1988).  
 
The objectives of the convention were therefore to regulate Antarctic mineral resource 
activities2, establish property and development rights, prevent an unregulated scramble 
by any nation and rivalry over strategic resources (Vicuna, 1988), while basically 
strengthening the ATS itself  (Greenpeace, 1985; Wallace, 1988). From the beginning, the 
negotiations were more a matter of principle, more a discussion about legal and political 
issues than about the value of minerals itself. Science had not yet established conclusively 
whether mineral reserves actually existed in Antarctica (Greenpeace, 1985). The 
consultative parties did not react to knowledge in scientific or environmental terms but 
to political, legal pressure and fear (Elliot, 1994). 
 
In 1988, the convention was ready for signature after six years of negotiations; however, 
it never came into force. Instead, an environmental protocol, the Madrid Protocol was 
1 1973 announcement by OPEC of finite oil reserves  
2 Which means activities relating to prospecting, exploration or development of mineral resources in 
the Treaty area and excludes scientific research activities. Mineral resources relates to all non-living 
natural non-renewable resources (Greenpeace, 1985) 
 1 
                                                 
Mineral Conflict in Antarctica during the 1980’s  
adopted in 1991, which prohibits any mining activities including prospecting for the next 
50 years.  
 
This review then, addresses the following question: 
 
What were the conflicts between the different parties and why did the 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
(CRAMRA) fail? 
 
The following objectives are sought: 
 
• What was the convention designed to do? 
• When and with how many member states did the discussion start? 
• What were the arguments/issues of the different countries concerning mining in 
the Antarctic? 
• What was the general consensus in 1988 with CRAMRA being open for 
signature? 
• What were the driving forces for the negotiations to fail, leading to the signing of 
the Madrid Protocol (1991), which included the permanent mining ban? 
• What were the specific reasons for France, Australia to vote against CRAMRA? 
• Despite its failure, what positive aspects came out of CRAMRA? 
• What further research might evolve from this review? 
 
2. Discussion around CRAMRA 
 
Due to the increasing pressure and discussion around the issues of mineral prospecting 
and exploitation of Antarctic resources, the Antarctic Consultative Parties meeting in 
Buenos Aires in July 1981 agreed to convene the Fourth Special Antarctic Consultative 
Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources. The Meeting started in Wellington in 1982 with 
14 consultative parties, and after 12 formal sessions and three informal intercessional 
meetings (Elliot, 1994), the then twenty consultative parties adopted the Convention on 
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) in July 1988. This 
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section reviews the issues and arguments different groups had during these six years and 
what they finally agreed to.  
 
Major tensions during these negotiations were between: claimants and non-claimants, 
“mining states” (likely sponsoring of exploration) and claimants, developed (especially 
miners) and developing nations, between superpowers, consultative and non-consultative 
powers, environmental inclined states, NGO’s and miners. These parties and their 
position are defined and evaluated in Appendix A (Beck, 1998; Elliot, 1994; Fogg, 1992; 
Greenpeace, 1985; Wallace, 1988).  
 
Generally, at the heart of the negotiations, especially between claimant and non-claimant 
states were the issue about sovereignty, basically about property rights. Beyond that, the 
question about liability, compliance and inspection was raised constantly. Overall each 
interested party tried to achieve a legal framework that will increase its own position once 
decisions for opening up an area, inspect or enforce the convention, formulate 
guidelines, consider applications or management schemes are to be made (Wallace, 
1988).  
 
Despite the differences, the parties involved had a “strong mutual interest in reaching an 
agreed and orderly solution to the issue of mineral resources” (Bilder in Elliot, 1994, 
p.199). In May/June 1988, during a two week ‘marathon’ meeting, a basic consensus was 
found, hence a compromise of the above mentioned issues. Christopher Beeby, Deputy 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and chairman of the Antarctic minerals negotiations, praised 
it as “an historic occasion which I believe will go down in Antarctic history as the most 
important political development regarding the regulation of Antarctica since the 
Antarctic Treaty itself” (ATCM/SCM-IV, 1988b, p.1 in Elliot, 1994) 
 
The mining convention, open for signature in 1988, provided a regulatory framework for 
mining (U.S. Congress, 1989). It was not designed to encourage mining nor establish a 
detailed mining code. It however contained general guidelines with some specific 
requirements and prohibitions (Herr, 1990), reached on the basic consensus approach by 
the ATCP. The agreement applied to all mineral activities on the continent and offshore 
areas, excluding the deep sea bed, which worldwide is regulated by UNCLOS.  
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Any decisions to mine had to take into consideration other already established activities 
in Antarctica such as science, tourism, conservation of marine living resources, 
preservation of historic monuments, navigation and aviation (Article 15) (SCAR, 2003, 
1988, Suter, 1991). Potential projects would only be authorized when they did not pose 
any effects on the above mentioned activities or pose any adverse environmental impacts 
(Article 4) (SCAR, 2003, 1988, U.S. Congress, 1989). While doing so CRAMRA 
distinguished between prospecting (‘activities including logistic support, aimed at 
identifying areas of mineral resource potential for possible exploration and 
development’), exploration (‘activities, including logistic support, aimed at identifying and 
evaluating specific mineral resources occurrences or deposits’), and development 
(‘activities, including logistic support, which take place following exploration and are 
aimed at or associated with exploitation of specific mineral resources deposits’) (Article 1 
(8)-(10)) (MoFA, 1988, SCAR, 2003, Suter, 1991) 
 
Minerals prospecting, exploration and development must be sponsored by a party to the 
convention. Sponsoring states must evaluate operators they sponsor and oversee their 
activities. In addition, sponsors must be prepared to defend and support the interest of 
their operators in institution meetings (U.S. Congress, 1989). Any exploration or 
development activities can however, under the laws established by CRAMRA, only 
proceed with environmental control and with specific approval by the established 
institutions (Taylor, 1989).  
 
The institutional structure is composed of a two-tired regime with one higher and several 
lower forms of authorities and a permanent secretariat in Wellington (Taylor, 1989) 
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Institution Membership Function Article  
Antarctic Mineral  ATCP main political body 18 - 22 
Resource  other nations engaged  oversee activities   
Commission in mineral research decides to open an area, all   
  other nations sponsoring  members have a veto power   
  such research settles disputes    
Scientific, Technical  all nations party  advised the commission 23 - 27 
and Environmental to CRAMRA not a decision making body   
Advisory Committee       
Special Meetings  the claimant state for  convened specifically to  28 
of Parties the specific area discuss the opening up of an    
  one non-claimant, area for mining   
  NGO, mining companies    
  other parties interested    
Regulatory   -"- regulate the activities 29-32 
Committee       
Secretariat assigned by the commission  service these four institutions 33 
Table 1 Institutional Structure in the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities (CRAMRA) (Herr, 1990, Kimball, 1988, Suter, 1991, Taylor, 
1989)  
 
Concerning sovereignty, the convention did not try to resolve territorial issues, but rather 
relied on the balance power between the various institutions of the regime (Taylor, 1989). 
Throughout the negotiations, parties persuaded Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, which 
under the convention remained unaffected. As all members in the commission possessed 
veto power, it ensured that despite the unresolved sovereignty issues, no country will 
benefit more than another (Elliot, 1994; Taylor, 1989).  
 
One of the most difficult issues, liability, was only partly solved under the convention. 
CRAMRA contains general liability provisions such as parties involved in the operation 
would be liable to repair any potential damage caused by their activity (Taylor, 1989). 
Beyond that, it required sponsoring states to ensure that prospectors maintain financial 
and technical means to continue their operation (Article 8(1), SCAR, 2003). If the 
prospector fails, the sponsoring state is responsible for stepping in (Article 37, SCAR, 
2003). Beyond that mining parties are levied taxes, which are partly used to form a fund 
to assist in the costs of repairing environmental damage if it occurred and proved too 
costly for a party to clean up (Taylor, 1989). Regarding exploration and development 
however, the involved parties agreed that a special Liability Protocol has to be negotiated 
before these activities could take place. Any disputes beyond these issues ought to be 
settled by the commission (Kimball, 1988).  
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An example of the requirements involved to be able to prospect, explore and develop 
under the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities 
(CRAMRA) can be found in Appendix B.  
 
To enter into force, the minerals regime needed ratification by 16 out of 20 voting 
members of the Antarctic Treaty. These must include the United States of America, 
USSR, and the claimant states: Argentine, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, 
Norway and Great Britain. Beyond that, the 16 states had to include five developing and 
eleven developed countries (Elliot, 1994).  
3. Failure of CRAMRA 
 
The necessary consensus about ratification of the minerals regime in 1988 among the 
claimant states, USSR and USA was unsuccessful. Australia and France refused to sign 
the convention, consequently CRAMRA did not enter into force (Elliot, 1994; Suter, 
1991). Instead, after only two years of negotiation, an environmental protocol, the 
Madrid Protocol, was signed, prohibiting mineral prospecting in Antarctica for 50 years 
(Suter, 1991). The following section will hence briefly explore the extrinsic and intrinsic 
factors, which led to the non-ratification of the minerals convention, as well as the 
position of Australia and France.  
 




The global political situation changed significantly since the start of the negotiations and 
discussion around mineral exploration in Antarctica. No immediate pressure on mineral 
resources existed, as the apartheid problem in South Africa and the cold war tensions 
were gone. In addition, the oil price was significantly lower than during the late 70’s and 
early 80’s (Wallace, 1988). Hence, there existed no immediate economic pressure for 
countries to explore Antarctica for potential resources.  
 
Despite a weaker economic demand for minerals, the public continued to pressure the 
consultative parties. The late 80’s mark the second wave of environmentalism 
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(Hemmings, 2003)3, which changed the question of acceptability of mineral activities. 
This wave was strengthened by four major environmental disasters that occurred during 
the signature year of CRAMRA4. Beyond that, NGO’s, mainly Greenpeace mobilised the 
public by trying to remap the image of Antarctica in peoples mind. They compared and 
broadcast waste sites in Antarctica, mainly near bases, with images of the clean, pure 
Antarctica (Hemmings, 2003). Other NGO’s raised awareness by publicising and 
educating people about Antarctic issues. Their main concern and criticism related to 
scientific, environmental and technical uncertainties of mining (Elliot, 1994, MoFA, 





Despite consensus on many issues achieved during the final meeting, tension still existed 
between the negotiators. This is not surprising, as CRAMRA could only enter into force 
if all claimant states, the US and USSR ratified the convention (Article 62) (Elliot, 1994). 
Other ATCP had to accept the special position of these countries, which actually 
questions the traditional consensus approach of the Antarctic Treaty (SCAR, 2003). 
Tensions also existed regarding the lack of clarity of the environmental standards, 
enforcement, compliance and liability of CRAMRA. Greenpeace (1985) stated that it was 
impossible to ensure that mining could be conducted in a safe manner and human 
fallibility could not be eliminated with current technology (Behrendt, 1983). Rigorous 
enforcement and liability still had to be complied once an area was suggested to be 
opened for mining (Wallace, 1988). Overall, to achieve consensus, the convention was 
kept very general with significant issues, like liability, still to be negotiated once economic 
mineable minerals were found.  
 
These internal and external issues influenced some countries, like Australia and France, 
to reject the convention. The relative easiness of this political change among nations has 
3 The first environmental wave was triggered by the book ‘The Silent Spring’ by Rachel Carson 
released in 1962 (Hemmings, 2003).  
4 28.01.1989 the Argentinean oil vessel Baiha Pariso ran aground off the US Palmer base, 07.02.1989 
the British vessel HMS Endurance ran aground near Deception Island, 28.02.1989 Peruvian oil vessel 
BIC Humboldt ran aground off King George island. These three disaster happened around the Antarctic 
peninsula whereas the worst of all oil spills during this time occurred of Alaska on the 24.03.1989, 
known as the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Joyner, 1995, Suter, 1991). 
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to be also seen on the basis that an activity was rejected, which had not yet taken place. It 
would have been for example far more difficult to ban fishing, which was already a well-
established activity in the Southern Ocean.  
 




Australia was the first nation to reject the mineral convention once it was open for 
signature. There are two major reasons for their change in policy. The environmental 
movement happening throughout the world also emerged in Australia. The weakness of 
the convention concerning environmental protection and the potential effects on 
Antarctica increased public awareness. This increasing concern occurred at the same time 
as national elections took place. When the strength of environmental parties increased5, 
the government saw it as an electoral advantage and necessity to reject CRAMRA and 
instead supported environmental and conservational interest in Antarctica (Elliot, 1994).  
 
In addition, domestic mining activities, already subsidized by the government, were seen 
by domestic mineral companies as under threat. The exploration of Antarctic minerals 
might decrease the value of minerals in Australia and the technological capacity was seen 
incompatible with other countries (Tsamenyi, 1989).   
 
The refusal to sign CRAMRA however did not happen lightly, as non-adoption could 
have been viewed as a major disruption of the ATS and might have implied foreign claim 
recognition by other states (Elliot, 1994; Lugt, 1996). This was not in Australia’s interest. 
For that reason, the government simultaneously proposed to set aside Antarctica as a 
wilderness reserve6. In case of non-recognition, it kept the option open to sign 
CRAMRA at a later stage, which was a preferred option than the threat of unregulated 
mineral activities or UN control (Elliot, 1994).  
 
 
5 The Green Independence won enough legislative seats in 1989 to dominate the balance power in the 
Tasmanian parliament (Elliot, 1994) 
6 Australia and also France intentionally did not propose Antarctica as a world park to distinguish 
themselves from NGO’s and hence to obtain more acceptability among treaty partners (Elliot, 1994) 
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France  
 
The French government soon followed Australia’s position. Their policy change was also 
mainly driven by the emerging environmental pressure and NGO activities. The French 
environmental group led by Jacques Cousteau supported Australia’s position and for 
example collected 1.2 million French signatures on a ‘Save the Antarctic’ petition (Suter, 
1991). In close cooperation with the Australian prime minister, Mr. Hawke, the French 
prime minister, M. Rocard, strongly supported the world reserve proposal and stated that 
in case of rejection, France might also rethink of signing the convention on a later stage 
(Lugt, 1996).  
 
Overall, it has to be stressed that neither France nor Australia tried to challenge either 
the treaty system or the consensus principle. They instead emphasized their continuous 
support for the treaty system and hence offered that consensus could be found on 
environmental regulation and standards. Such a strategy ought to protect the continent 
while putting a ban on mineral activities (Elliot, 1994). This proposal was soon supported 
by the Belgium, Italian, Indian and New Zealand government. In Britain, parliamentary 
discussion about a potential mining ban took place, while in the United States, senator Al 
Gore called in the congress for full protection of Antarctica. Despite this, the state 
department continued to support the convention, believing that Australia would soon 
change its position. Public support to this idea was also increasingly coming from within 
NGO’s such as the WWF and Friends of the Earth.  
 
As the issue of environmental protection became stronger, more and more consultative 
parties, in addition to these aforementioned nations, questioned on whether to ban 
mineral exploration, an option, which was rejected in 1970’s. The United States still 
rejected a total ban on mining and only compromised on a temporal mining ban of 50 
years. With this in mind, the consultative parties negotiated by the end of October 1991 a 
new legally binding agreement on environmental protection, the Madrid protocol. This 
environmental protocol prohibits mineral exploration and even prospecting till 2041 and 
erected new environmental principles and standards (Beck, 1998; Fogg, 1992; Herr, 1990; 
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4. Conclusion 
 
During the 1970’s, mineral issues became more and more important as countries saw 
current mineral supply from South Africa and Russia under threat, as well as recognised 
the limit of future oil reserves. During that time, Antarctica gained importance as an 
unexplored, potentially rich mineral continent. Likewise the threat for unregulated 
mineral activities in Antarctica was recognised, which saw the seeds for the establishment 
of a mineral convention now known as CRAMRA (Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities). After six years of negotiation due to internal 
conflicts and external pressure, the convention was open for signature in November 
1988. To enter into force it had to be signed by all claimant states, the U.S. and USSR. 
Australia and France, being claimant nations, however refused to sign the convention, 
which led to its ultimate failure.  
 
The convention can however not be viewed as a complete failure. The ability of the ATS 
to respond to external pressure demonstrated its robustness and strength. External and 
internal disruption did not challenge the foundation of the ATS. The increased legitimacy 
of the ATS was further demonstrated by the rapid expansion of ATS membership, which 
rose by 14 member during 1980 to 1991. Beyond that, the drafting of CRAMRA aided 
towards the negotiation of the Madrid Protocol, which hence was adapted within three 
years (Schram Stokke, 1996). CRAMRA created three normative principles7, which were 
ultimately strengthened in the Madrid Protocol.  
 
What remains questionable however is, whether CRAMRA had still failed if a different 
approach towards the negotiations had taken place. Major drawbacks of the negotiations 
were the exclusion of public or political discussions, which might have challenged 
conventional wisdom on the acceptability of minerals. The quest for observer status by 
NGO’s and NCP was initially rejected and even after permission, documents or the 
revised draft of  the convention was only handed out to ATCP (Elliot, 1994). Beyond 
that, SCAR, the scientific research body of Antarctica, was not requested to assess 
7 These are: 1. the requirement of an Environmental Impact Assessment, 2. the requirement of 
sufficient knowledge prior to decision making regarding activities in Antarctica, 3. the normative 
principle of an enforcement mechanisms involving inspection, liability and compliance {Joyner, 1995 
#16}. 
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environmental, scientific nor technical issues surrounding mining. CRAMRA negotiated 
by the ATCP lost major credibility due to these factors.  
 
Minerals activities have only been banned till 2048. Antarctic activities become more and 
more divers and hence the Antarctic Treaty, established almost 50 years ago, more 
difficult to apply e.g. the issue around bioprospecting (Hemmings, 2003). Thus, the 
question remains, if the ATS will survive in future in case major economic viable mineral 
reserves are found in Antarctica, which outweigh environmental concerns. Potential for 
future research also exist in the field if exploitable resources would sow the seeds for 
conflict and military involvement8, which would breach the Antarctic Treaty (Article 1) 
(SCAR, 2003). Another interesting angle to be explored is to what extend presently 
scientific geological research aids in locating resources as currently not even prospecting 
is permitted under the Madrid Protocol. These gaps in the research show that despite the 
failure of CRAMRA, the consensus on the Madrid Protocol, the issue around mineral 
resources is still significant.  
8 As Cornelius van der Lugt points out ”Connection between resources and security are no longer 
limited to classical geopolitical factors (such as location, sea passage or minerals). Environmental 
degradation, resource depletion, and security of access to increasingly scarce reserves of energy and 
other raw materials may be far more important sources of human and interstate conflict in future” (Lugt 
v.d, C. p. 230) 
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Appendix A 
 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (Wallace, 1988) 
 
Claimants      Non Claimants 
 
Argentina ++      USA *** 
Chile ++      Japan *** 
New Zealand ++     West Germany *** 
Norway ++      Brazil * 
Australia * ++      USSR * 
France ***      South Africa * 
UK *** +      GDR = 
       India 
       China 
       Belgium 
       Italy = 
       Uruguay 
       Poland 
 
*** indicates nations with strongest desire and potential to mine 
*    indicates nations with interests as eventual miners as being presently behind necessary 
technology 
+   Environmental inclined 
=   suppliers of energy support (includes Sweden) 
 
Developing Nations (ref 3) 
This includes Brazil, India, China, Uruguay and to a less extent Argentina and Chile 
 
NGO 
The most dominant NGO’s during the discussion were the Association for Southern 
Ocean Coalition (ASOC), with major emphasis coming from Greenpeace and the 
International Union for the Conservation of  nature (IUCN). 
 
 14 
Mineral Conflict in Antarctica during the 1980’s  
Objectives in negotiations: 
 
Claimants  
• recognition of their special position as claimants, 
• economic benefit of from the regime, which would however frustrate the 
implementation of the convention and undermine the compromise of all parties 
favoured in the convention, 
• claim that prior occupation Antarctica was ‘res nullis’ - property of no one. Their 
claims were made on grounds such as exploration and developments, which 
hence should be recognised, 
• exercises of their law, 
• veto on management scheme 
 
Non-claimants 
• opposed recognition of special position of claimants 
• limit powers of claimants to extract special concession 
• criticise the voting power of the ATS 
• claim the right to administer Antarctica as well 
• most and in accordance with claimant states reject the view of Malaysia, NGO’s 
and others outside the treaty that Antarctica is Common Heritage of Mankind 
(along with deep see bed and outer space) 
• Superpowers: USA and USSR: Despite not being a claimant state, they demand 
special privilege under CRAMRA (seat on all Regulatory Comittees) because of 
their existence of their “basis of claim”. However this recognition is in reality not 




• avoid the “parasitic” demands of the claimants (not including UK & France) 
• easiest condition on management schemes and a clear run for their developers 
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• assure that they provide high standard of environmental protection in case ever 
mined (group for mining), yet reject to accept absolute an unlimited liability9 
• avoid control on prospecting 
• limit the power and demands of developing countries, reject technology sharing 
• ensure confidentiality of aspects of application, data and other information 
• avoid sharing financially, hence security of ownership of any resources found 
 
Developing Nations 
• Antarctica is a common heritage, belongs to all, should be managed by all – ‘res 
communis’ - property of all - like under the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 198210 
• criticises the close atmosphere of the negotiations/management of ATS 
• Antarctica should be protected world park managed under the United Nations 
(UN) 
• In case of mining, demand technology sharing and hence a right of participation 
in joint ventures 
• Financial reward  
• Seats on the regulatory Committee allotted to developing countries 
• Demand the provision of property and development rights for developing 
nations not party in the Antarctic Treaty 
• Prospect of minerals led to more and more developing states joining the treaty 
such as China (1983) and South Korea (1986) 
 
NGO’s 
• judge CRAMRA as an institution that facilitates mining rather than preventing 
illegal exploitation 
• favour world park accessible to no one for development  and managed under UN 
• criticise environmental standards and the ability to control environmental  impact 
and that these issues were dealt with separate from political and legal issues 
• convention will provide political accommodation between the parties in terms of 
mining 
9 The reluctance of the USA, West Germany, France, Japan and the UK to accept absolute and 
unlimited liability shows that they did not believe mining is undoubtedly safe (3) 
10 The Law of the Sea states that the deep sea bed outside national jurisdiction is a common heritage of 
mankind (Hemmings, 2003 
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• stress the importance for at least an independent environmental protection 
agency, which is independent to any government 
• stress the point that mining will endanger security, countries will likely defend 
their resources, which than would be against the treaty hence a likely failure of 
ATS, this mining is like ‘sowing the seeds for conflict’ 
• criticise that negotiations were behind closed doors and that no public record of 
the debate is available 
• were at first rejected when they tried to get observer status and not even SCAR 
was invited as an observer or asked to provide scientific, environmental or 
technical reports 
• argue that the real value lies in scientific secrets, genetic potential, aesthetic and 
spiritual values, essential role in maintenance of global biophysical system and 
political stability and that these values outweigh financial and geopolitical gains to 
nations from the extraction of minerals  
 
Environmentally Minded States 
• public process and accessibility of information 
• controls over prospecting 
• absolute and unlimited liability 
• decision break between exploration and development 
• inspection and monitoring powers to all parties and all institutions 
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Appendix B 
 
The mining system was designed to operated as follows: “An ‘operator’ (for example, 
Exxon or Shell) had to acquire a ‘sponsoring state’ (which is a Party to CRAMRA with 
which it had a “substantial and genuine link”, such as being based in that party’s 
jurisdiction, as with the US or UK). The initial question for the sponsoring state was 
whether the proposed area of mining was open for that kind of mining. If it was, then an 
application for exploration would have been filed with the Regulatory Committee 
responsible for the region in which the proposed mining area fell. If not, then the 
sponsoring state would have requested the Secretariat to seek approval for opening up 
the area. A Special Meeting of Parties would have been required. This was only advisory; 
the key decision would have been made at the next stage by the Commission. Assuming 
that the Commission agreed, then it would have established a Regulatory Committee: ten 
members, which would have included the sponsoring state, relevant claimant nations, the 
USA and USSR. The Regulatory Committee would have taken on the detailed 
consideration of the proposed mining itself (as distinct from whether or not an area 
should be opened up for exploration). Assuming that the proposed management scheme 
was satisfactory, then an exploration permit would have been issues.” (Suter, 1991, p.57) 
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